Abstract A great deal of current planning literature is concerned with the behaviour of public sector planners and their roles within organizations. What is lacking, however, is a more nuanced understanding of what ideas or concepts people use to think about their roles in organizations, and how their very personalities have become tied into the creation of professionalism. This article looks at the dilemmas for public servants in a Norwegian municipality and shows how structural dilemmas may be internalized by individual employees. The emic concept of 'loyalty' is shown to symbolize attempts to individualize such dilemmas and render them subject to personality, rather than recognize them as conceptual problems.
Introduction
Planners are constantly implored to improve, to listen better (Forester, 1989) , be more inclusive (Healey, 1997) or be more persuasive (Throgmorton, 1996) . We might well ask, however, why it is that planners meet such stringent and endless normative demands on their personal skills and their moral and political characters. In order for 'planning' to be inclusive, collaborative, deliberative, rational or sensitive, we require planners to facilitate or even to enact all of these attributes and qualities, themselves, as persons. While some planners adopt strategies to manage dilemmas (Thomas and Healey, 1991) , in the case study presented, planners and other policy makers relate this to particular types of personality. What I want to show is how such dilemmas may be subject to organizational regimes, and how this affects the experiences of public servants. One might further ask why planners need to be so good. Perhaps the need for such specific personalities suggests that the role they are required to fill is intolerable for most people? And what is more intolerable than the need to live-out unresolvable dilemmas in the practice of democratic governance?
In this article, I take a very specific case study, and present an analysis that offers an insight into the particular conditions found there. This is not an attempt to provide a generalizable explanation (less still a 'model'), neither is it a foray into the psychology of employees (Tewdwr-Jones, 2002) but it is intended to show what kinds of analysis might help us to understand why such emphasis is placed on normative demands of planners' behaviours. The case study considers the demands made on planners and other strategic-level public servants in a Norwegian municipality. Such public servants are constantly required to balance different kinds of interests and make meaning out of contradictory demands. They must create arguments based on their professional knowledge and opinions, and on their knowledge of the political conditions within the municipality, they must bear in mind the interests of local residents, and consider carefully how they represent the organization within which they work. In this, they share with many other public service planners. Within this specific environment, these pressures are discussed in terms of the public servant balancing demands between their loyalty to their profession, their municipality (in the person of the Chief Executive) and their colleagues, local residents and others. In doing so, it is clear that these public servants are key agents in the creation of certain ways of thinking about political problems and the resolution of conflicting interests that they resolve through discourse about personalities and behaviours.
The pressure on Norwegian planners and other public servants to exhibit appropriate forms of loyalty is one such quality that I believe papers over a structural dilemma in the constitution of governmental bodies. That both public employees and politicians feel divided or contradictory loyalties demonstrates that this is a fault-line in the practice of government that ought to be taken seriously. While the problem of the loyalty of politicians and public servants may sometimes be dismissed as a procedural or structural detail, in practice the question of loyalty presents itself as a lookingglass, through which many other complex dilemmas and organizational paradoxes may be revealed. While public servants may come forward with a model that outlines when and where their loyalty should switch from being aligned to the interests of 'the public' or 'the citizens' towards obedience to the council, further investigation shows that the gap between model and practice is an uncomfortable zone that is seldom made explicit.
In this article, I present a detailed examination of the dilemmas facing strategic-level public servants in one organization, and from that draw out some broader issues that are often hidden behind institutionalized 'problems'. In particular, we see that there are conflicts between the public and the private, between corporate and representative roles of government bodies, and between professional rigour and the organizational 'public face'. In extension of the quality of loyalty, a discourse is identified about what 'kind of people' planners and other public servants should be. While we often may take for granted that planners 'should' accord to certain normative models of good professional behaviour, the extension of that belief into discussions of personality types shows us that the structures of organizations can have profound implications for employment policies and organizational environments. Not least, if we find the 'right kind of person' with characteristics and personality suited to one role, this suggests that other types of role, that would require other kinds of people, are being systematically under-prioritized, or that a systematic reproduction of a certain class (in its widest sense) of person is dominating the profession, to the exclusion of others. Are structural dilemmas being resolved by finding 'the right kind of person', and what does this imply for issues of equality of opportunity and representation?
Theoretical context: organizational 'cultures'?
Rather than explore here a total-theory on the concept of loyalty in organizations, this article looks at the use of the concept within one particular organization in order to understand how the organization functions. In other words, rather than asking 'what is loyalty?' generally (Sager, 1998) , here I am asking, 'why is loyalty so important to this organization?', and 'what does the term "loyalty" mean to these actors?'. Loyalty is often one of those elements of an organization that is described under the rubric of organizational culture. We probably all recognize that there are some organizations where employees or members are expected to 'toe the line' absolutely, and others where dynamic openness is more highly valued. Within, between and around such organizations, certain 'kinds of people' find themselves more or less comfortable. This is not a psychological investigation of how people with certain psychological tendencies cope better or worse with particular circumstances, but rather an investigation into why organizations prefer people with certain characters, and why organizational demands can lead to demands on the very personality of its employees. This is also related to a question of how an organization disciplines (in the Foucauldian sense) its employees: how are employees coerced into certain kinds of behaviour and why (Kunda, 1992) . Rather than making a general examination of the means by which organizations construct a pervasive 'ethos' among their members, a task too broad for the present context, this article examines one element that reveals how deeply organizational ideals are ingrained into the actions of individuals.
The collected practices of an organization that leads its members to behave in certain ways are often referred to as an 'organizational culture'. Many who write within organizational studies tend to think of culture as an attribute that organizations have (Wright, 1994) , and which can be manipulated by managerial means. However, many have argued that culture is, rather, what organizations are. That is, the notion of 'culture' is an abstraction from the external expression of a cumulative series of relations and transactions, as well as the collective representations of shared understandings and beliefs (Kuper, 1999) . While it is useful to consider culture as something an organization is, however, Stapley argues that it is still necessary to consider 'how (or if) culture is to be demarcated from other social aspects of the organization' (Stapley, 1996: 9) . He suggests a distinction, therefore, between culture and social structure, in order to illustrate how formal structures may be altered without producing the changes in practice that may be desired, since they are not congruent with the culture (way of doing and thinking about things) of the organization. However, it is still important to distinguish here between formal organizational structures such as management structures as an instrumental agent in organizations and the tacit ideal organization that exists as a mental construct, and the products of various coercive social forces that form social structures in the sociological sense. While still noting that social structure and culture are both constructs, Stapley addresses the behaviour of individual actors as constituent parts of the organization-as-culture. Examining the organization as a process of human behaviour, he develops a psychodynamic approach to the study of organizations that incorporates both the conscious and subconscious ways that individuals treat the organization ' "as if" it were real' (Stapley, 1996: 37) . This allows analysis of organizational constructs through people's behaviours and rationalizations within the organization, their descriptions of the structures they perceive, and their explanations of their own actions and those of others. Stapley, therefore, analyses people's behaviour toward the organization as if it were another social actor. While not proposing a psychodynamic analysis here, taking the experiences of participants in the study in good faith, that is 'as if' the organization had its own external existence is, in my view, probably the only way to offer a full account of organizational experience.
The position of individuals within organizations is certainly complex and difficult to address. The now classic work of Michael Lipsky demonstrated some of the effects on individuals within public service organizations of their position relative to the dilemmas that characterize local authorities (Lipsky, 1980) . By focusing on the experiences of individuals within the organization, Lipsky is able to create a vivid picture of how the organization appears to both employees and clients. More particularly, he shows how certain employees face structural dilemmas more immediately than others, due to their role within the organization. Lipsky showed how the strategic dilemmas of resolving increasing demand for welfare with tighter budgets and cuts in services re-emerge at the 'street level' as an everyday tension for the officers administering local government services. These administrators, who are in direct contact with the people requesting, or demanding, service, internalize the broader structural tensions in the political economy of public authorities, and resolve them through recourse to their own moral judgements, an instance also demonstrated by Vike and Kronenfeld (Kronenfeld and Vike, 2002) . In other words, external constraints are translated into internalized moral rationalizations by individuals within organizations, not least because, as Stapley says, the organization appears 'real' to the individual not least through the external constraints that it represents.
The conflict between the constraints of both broader and organizational political economies and the ambitions of individuals is particularly vivid within certain professions. Where individuals follow vocations whose ambitions are constructed in terms of, for example, patient welfare, social wellbeing, and not in terms of budgetary discipline, there is an unavoidable conflict of interest in their roles in the public sector when budgets are limited. It is probably no coincidence to find that those involved in economic administration in the organization described below are those who appear to have least difficulty with budget discipline. The dominance of these disciplinary mentalities has been explored in its incarnation in the 'audit cultures' of contemporary British and other states, and in its infiltrations into many different professional fields (Strathern, 2000) . In the Norwegian context budget discipline has come perhaps later, but equally overwhelmingly to organizational spheres, and certainly to local government. The Norwegian welfare state grew steadily following its establishment in the mid-20th century, until its ambitions began to spiral beyond the reach of even the oil-enriched Norwegian national economy. As a consequence, the experience of financial constraint on welfare provision has been a relatively new one in Norwegian local government, and one that presents distinctly uncomfortable challenges for many politicians and public servants. In the context of financial constraint, loyalty to budgetary limitations, or 'budget discipline' has become another measure of good behaviour in municipal management (Vike, 2003) . For Norwegian planners who are mainly 'socialplanners' (in contrast to British 'land-use planners') budget discipline is becoming an increasingly significant element within their role. Whereas Abram Personality and professionalism 25 great emphasis is put on the need to be socially inclusive, this is now defined within a realm of 'realism' itself defined largely by financial limits. The consequences of this new logic for public servants are explored below.
Local paradigms
While Norway is often regarded as an unusually wealthy and successful welfare state, it shares with most of its neighbours a monetary politics that attempts to restrict, or reduce public expenditure at the local level. Some authors have argued that it is a victim of its own success, in that demand for welfare services always increases, and expectations only rise (Hanson, 1999) . Indeed, Lipsky also argued that it is in the nature of the welfare state that demand will always outstrip supply: the welfare state will always be short of money, budgets will always be restrictive (Lipsky, 1980) . Throughout most of the early post-war period, though, the Norwegian welfare state was in expansion. As the economy grew, so did support for local welfare, and expectations grew in response to this. Only towards the 1990s did Norway enter into a political and economic environment that prioritized reduction in public expenditure, in line with changes in the neighbouring EU and broader markets. This left local government in a new position. Whereas they had been used to a strong regional policy that attempted to level out costs across the whole country (minimizing economies of scale and subsidising costs of distance), now most districts began to face reductions in their budgets. Many councils attempted to avoid directly cutting services, attempting instead to institute measures towards effectiveness, efficiency, etc. By 2000, and into the 21st century, many districts are facing real cuts in services, with an (economically) right-wing dominated government coalition urging increases in user-payment for welfare services. As a result, local authorities -municipalities -are struggling with difficulties of retaining legitimacy in the face of declining popular participation in local politics (declining party membership and cynicism over council activities) and cuts in the services offered by local councils. As these new dilemmas press upon local councils, and many try to make changes that might increase the efficiency of their bureaucracies, they also have unexpected consequences in the workings of local democratic bodies. Many of the problems of deteriorating conditions are played out as problems of personnel management or other forms of internal tension within bureaucracies. Many Norwegian municipal councils are undergoing managerial reorganization (with varying results), but such formal changes are tending to support a neo-liberalization of local government (despite backlashes and alternative models being put forward). One of the consequences of such changes has been increasing strain in the working relationships within and between council administrators and politicians. While, at the same time, many councils are attempting to increase the communication Planning Theory 3(1) 26 between employees and integrate services, this has put increasing pressure on councils as organizations. As cracks appear, a number of devices are being used to cover them over, and it is my contention that a peculiar notion of 'loyalty' is functioning as one of these.
During 2000, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork within a municipal council (what, in British terms, would be called a district council) in eastern Norway, not far from the capital, Oslo. 1 This district is under development pressure as it is in easy commuting distance to the capital, and its population is predominantly wealthy, educated and mobile. For the sake of confidentiality, in this article I refer to the municipality as 'Vestforstad'. The term 'planner' within the Norwegian local government system refers to a much more general policy strategist than in most UK local authorities, and it is this meaning which is implied by the term here, rather than specifically landuse strategists, but I believe the material has much to offer planners internationally, many of whom many work in such strategic roles.
In Vestforstad, administrators and politicians have developed a paradigm in relation to the tensions felt by individuals and the balance of power between them. It relates to practices and ideologies of loyalty and professionalism and is related to legal statutes concerning the conduct of local government. My questions about the relationship between politicians and administrators began to elicit comments about the need for loyalty as an overriding quality of that relationship. Different forms of loyalty indeed form the basis for a well-functioning council, and I will attempt to outline the forms of loyalty current in the municipality during the period of my fieldwork there. Other Norwegian ethnographers have confirmed that discussions of loyalty are a widespread phenomenon within Norwegian municipalities. It should be noted that this is not a discussion of the concept of loyalty, per se, or an externally imposed typology related to the case in question. On the contrary, my intention here is to set out the concept of loyalty that was adopted by the people in Vestforstad municipality to represent their experiences of municipal life. While this might be compared with notions of loyalty used by other planners (such as those discussed in Thomas and Healey, 1991) , the loyalties discussed here are presented as 'ethnographic facts', not as external analytical constructs.
The most central form of loyalty is circumscribed by law. The District and Regional Law, Kommuneloven, specifies that it is the responsibility of the chief executive of the council to ensure that all committee papers are properly and defensibly prepared, and that decisions are acted on, i.e. that administrators are 'loyal' to political decisions. This specification relates to the separation of politics and administration, in classic form. The chief executive in Vestforstad, 'Trond', 2 interpreted this as offering good advice and information to politicians: administration that is not busy with party politics but comes with material they can trust. It is a supporting role, an advisory role.
This separation of the political and administrative requires constant maintenance and surveillance, however, as the boundaries are blurred and rely on personal relationships, such as that between the chief executive and the mayor. In Vestforstad, these two often stated that they had a good working relationship in which they could advise each other if they felt they had stepped into each other's territory. From their offices next door to each other on the top of the town hall, the chief executive explained:
We talk together constantly and can correct each other. I can say to the mayor, 'that is my job' and the mayor can say to me, 'Trond, now you are doing politics, that is my job'. This definition of roles followed a slightly different pattern through the rest of the district, according to 'Kristin', the economist-secretary to the health and social services department. She explained the concept of loyalty by suggesting that her loyalty was not directly towards politicians but within the administration. She said:
It is not a relationship of loyalty I have with politicians. We will propose the best basis for decision making to them. What is important is that the committee has good enough information to work with in the overall council to the benefit of our sector . . . because, you can say that the head of Health and Social department is not concerned with getting the most money, but the Health and Social committee is. The head of the department is not out after the most money possible but to do the most with it. But a leader of the Health and Social committee will argue in the budget committee and the council to get the most possible money for the sector, so the sector is prioritized.
This means, in effect that administration and politicians have not only different interests but also rather different sets of loyalties. Within the health sector, the administration had advised the politicians through the year that they were heading for overspend unless they changed the criteria for eligibility for some services. But the politicians did not want to take decisions about cutting services and hoped to get more council money for health services instead. As Kristin says,
We have a lot of elderly people in Vestforstad and we have waiting lists. People don't get the home help they need from the service and the waiting lists get longer and longer . . . And the administration sees that. So it is our responsibility to maybe write a paper on new criteria for the service. We come along with a proposal that we have only so much money and that we must change the criteria, but the Health and Social committee say 'no, no, we must Planning I suggested that it must be difficult sometimes to recommend something for the good of clients, but have politicians decide something else. 'Yes,' she says, 'they do that a lot. That really is very difficult', because all the time politicians are saying 'no cuts, we must have more money', and in the meantime the council is still spending too much, so they have to save twice as much later on. Kristin explained this as a problem of (lack of) budget discipline (on the part of politicians). However, she then went on:
That said, we must be loyal to the decisions they take. But . . . we are of course loyal to the budget and financial framework that they voted for too, right?
(Me) so you have differing loyalties?
Yes, that is absolutely it. It is rather difficult when you find that you don't have enough money.
. . . We mean that we are loyal to the framework, but they say that it is difficult to take responsibility for quality going down. So the chief executive says that he is loyal to the council's decision.
In other words, in being loyal to the budget, one cannot simultaneously be loyal to politicians' criteria for service distribution. Typically, when such problems were returned to politicians, they deferred action until 'the next' financial quarter. Recently, indeed, politicians were reported to have been 'shocked' by the consequences of their own budget decisions (Budstikka). Simultaneously many in both administration and political groups claimed that the municipality's budgets were often mysteriously flexible, with extra money being 'found' when it was really needed. This, however, despite being well recognized, was not generally considered a basis on which to work. Administrators remained within the space between budget and aspirations.
Thus, administrators must be loyal to decisions but also to economic frameworks, and this overrides any potential loyalty towards clients and their needs. This particular relationship is personified in that between the Chief Executive and the Mayor, where the former must be loyal towards the latter, as the former 'stands for' the administration, and the latter 'stands for' the council. However, within the organization, the economic and managerial framework also requires loyalty to the Chief Executive as the personification of the administrative corporation.
Kristin considered this form of hierarchical loyalty to management, explaining that for her,
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To be loyal is easy when we know we can bring good advice to the Chief Executive and he thinks it is good. Because he has confidence in us, so we know that we can give clout to what we say to him. Then it is easy to be loyal. Because his and our advice is equal.
Here, Kristin is beginning to talk about the balance in the relationship between leaders at different levels in the council administration. Whilst making a general point about confidence and loyalty being complementary, she is also showing how they are hierarchical: loyalty flows upwards and confidence downwards, and they are mutually reinforcing. She pointed out that the chief executive has confidence in the professional judgement of his department leaders. Without that confidence, he could begin to question all sorts of things, but he does not do that because he has confidence that they are working properly. And in return for that confidence, he expects loyalty, and vice versa. However, she also went on, in a way that was reminiscent of the chief executive's account, to describe what she would say publicly and what she would not say, that is to talk about the role of loyalty in the public face of the organization. Other members of the administration also explained that they would never speak critically to the press about the council. Here, the corporate loyalty of the employee to both council and politicians was paramount. The chief executive said,
[my loyalty to political decisions] is quite unshakeable if the press then ring the next day and say, 'they decided this and that. Do you have any comment?' . . . Then I say that it is a clear and good decision that I shall immediately act upon. They won't get me to say anything negative about it. And they have given up trying. Because they know that is how it is.
I asked: So you believe it is very important for you to show publicly that you are being loyal?
Absolutely.
Kristin echoed this:
What I say to a journalist is what the health and Social director has said. But I say that after we have written the committee papers. Then I can say something about what is in the papers. But while we are working on a case, like the budget we are working on now, then I can't say anything until we have concluded the process and the director is ready.
She did not feel it was a problem to have the press ring up and ask about committee papers. If they asked about a particular case, say an elderly woman who has had poor service, then it is not her place to answer the case,
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as that is the director's job to clear up the mess. However, for her it was also no problem not to publicly voice an opinion, since she felt she had significant influence over the director.
If I come with advice over how a problem can be solved if it is to do with the budget, just as the chief executive never questions our professional work, the director never questions my opinion either. He has confidence in me.
A recent survey of Norwegian municipalities indicated that only very few municipalities recognize the rights to free speech of employees, despite its being enshrined in law (Kommunal Rapport 2003) . On the contrary, they tend to varying degrees to stress the notion of corporate loyalty, warning administrators not to speak out about internal affairs. Unfortunately, in some cases (as in this case study), the result was a reluctance on the part of administrators to act effectively when encountering excessive risks or bad practice within the municipality (recent crises have, in fact, led to the resignation -not entirely voluntarily -of the chief executive).
Clearly, these aspects of loyalty and confidence, public image and professional/private opinions are closely interrelated. However, for individual administrators, loyalty may become a rather more complex issue. First, they must negotiate situations where, for example, a department leader may appear to give instructions not entirely in line with the chief executive's pronouncements. A hierarchy of relationships of loyalty requires consistency that may not be in place. Second, it so happens that the chief executive and some of the department leaders were trained as engineers. They had a similar structure of reasoning in their decision-making that others did not necessarily share. How do administrators reconcile their own professional knowledge with the different expectations of both leaders and politicians? Professional knowledge is an important issue within the council. It appears to be a constant dilemma for many administrators who at the same time put forward their professional opinions on the legitimacy for their recommendations, whilst they also use it as a means to distinguish themselves. Professionalism can be defined in a variety of ways. For Kristin, professionalism is the act of distancing oneself from the consequences of political decisions. If she were to fight for her own health sector, and that had consequences for schools, that would be political. The ability to distance oneself from the broader context was widely attributed to facets of one's character. Indeed, the Chief Executive suggested the same. He described the communication between administration and politicians in the following exchange:
If politicians are about to decide something stupid and I realise that is because the papers they are using are not good enough, or if they take up something that is not in the papers and they do something stupid because they have not had appropriate advice, then I can do one of two things. I can either take back Abram Personality and professionalism 31 the papers, and say 'this is a new element and I would like a week to work on that then you will get advice that covers this element'. Or I can explain verbally in the meeting what I have not said in writing to explain that it is stupid. But if they vote to accept it, from that instant, I am an enthusiastic defender of whatever they have decided. It is my job to defend that and put it into action.
I asked if that felt strange or if it was something one had to learn, and he responded:
No! If it feels strange, one should find another job. One must accept that politicians make the decisions. I recommend, they decide, I follow up. It must be natural for people in my position . . . you do learn that, but I have never found that difficult. But on the other hand, I insist on the right to put my opinion forward very clearly. And politicians find that unpleasant, because they think that is unnecessary. But once I have said my piece, then I accept whatever they decide and then follow it up.
In other words, and according to others in the administration, there is a time for loyalty, and a time for argument. And the distinction between these two times is the political decision. 3 However appalling the decision, however destructive or ineffective, it is the responsibility of the administration to be loyal to that decision in order to avoid being political.
This issue arose again in a discussion with the Executive committee (formannskapet) and Directors (kommunesjefer) during an annual weekend seminar for review and agenda setting. After two days of what, to me, appeared as highly ritualized debate, I asked about the significant silences, particularly from the administrators present. Why, I asked, even in a relatively informal meeting, at a country hotel, were administrators sitting silently waiting to be asked for information that would inform the discussions? Afterwards, in the swimming pool, and over drinks in the room of one of the politicians, I received answers to my questions. One director explained to me that he would never respond instantly to an issue raised, or interrupt a political debate to bring a point of order or information. He was on constant guard, he said, against becoming political, and every utterance he made was considered and reflected on once, twice, even three times, before ensuring that it was the best possible information, and not simply a reflection of his own personal preferences. Two politicians who also worked within the administration also said that they had to be extremely careful about using information from their working lives within their roles as politicians. It would be wrong simply to base political arguments on one's own experience, they said, and it would be a failure of duty to use their political role merely to the benefit of their section of the administration. Distancing administrative activity from political decisions came through as an extremely important and sometimes difficult process.
This particular code of loyalty to decisions proved much more difficult
Planning Theory 3(1) 32 for others in the administration. Whilst for accountants like Kristin, she could make a clear divide between trying to get more money and making the most of the money available, she admitted that for others with a profession that demanded compassion with service-users, this could be more difficult. Clearly, for doctors and nurses, for example (as will be familiar to British readers), the competition between budgets and patient care can be a far from straightforward dilemma. Even in the arena of cultural services, this could promote painful tensions for individual administrators. One such case is described below.
For 'Astrid', loyalty was much more messily divided. Astrid had been involved in a difficult situation earlier in the year, when a journalist had asked her about the consequences of the cuts that politicians had just adopted. She admitted to the journalist that the decision would mean the end of some popular events. Her own sector leader had not allowed her to speak up in the committee meeting and explain the consequences of the cuts the politicians were about to make. He, the leader, appeared to be more concerned with maintaining his own relationship with the committee, and it seemed that he was prepared to sacrifice some parts of the sector to sustain some others. (Here, again, was a very interesting question of loyalty of speech/action versus deed, since this leader spoke very critically, even disrespectfully of the chief executive in meetings, yet carried out the chief executive's directives to the letter despite outcry amongst his own staff and the reduction in cultural activities in the district). Astrid felt therefore more loyal towards those members of the public who would lose their opportunity to access services, than to the public face of the committee. The chief executive analysed this as follows, with, I would argue, some implicit criticism of the former service director, who later lost his post:
. . . it is quite natural that she should boil over with disappointment and let that show . . . because she did not have an opportunity to give her opinion, so that finds a way out later. You must have the opportunity to say your bit then and there and if you are sure that they have understood, then it is easier to accept afterwards.
However, for Astrid it was also a question of what she described as loyalty to her professionalism. She found it scandalous that some of her colleagues appeared simply not to care about the services they offered. For her it was a matter of principle to do her job to the best of her ability, and for her that meant offering an excellent service. It is also possible to see her dealing with the politicians' unwillingness to discuss cuts. Where they talk about efficiency savings, imagining that savings could be made continually without affecting the level of service, for her this means further cuts in cleaning and security staff and the need to find money for nationally agreed pay rises out of decreasing budgets. But it is not just the politicians who make these suggestions. The economists in the town hall send further instructions on Abram Personality and professionalism 33 how much money should be saved, without any indication that they realize the consequences of these demands. While they may argue that this is the mechanism by which politicians see the results of their decisions, to which they are being loyal, for Astrid, it was not morally or professionally acceptable to demonstrate the effects of poor decisions by causing suffering to service-users, when they could be predicted beforehand. For her, it would have been better that politicians understood exactly what it is they were doing when they voted on budget cuts. That is, the abstracting action of budgeting should, rather, be directly related back to its consequences. 'Budget discipline' should be bared through its concrete effects. It is worth mentioning that Vestforstad's town hall sits on a hill on the edge of the town centre, and that all sectors, health, education, culture, technical, and so on, work from various buildings around the town, as in many local authorities. Those who worked in the town hall tended to be economists and central service managers. Astrid, therefore, could refer to those 'up at the town hall' as being distanced not only from the consequences of political decisions but also from any knowledge about how services are run. She complains, for example, that the deputy directors of the council send decrees about the budget without reflection on what budget cuts might mean.
'Mette' can just say that we simply have to find money from the budget for salary increases without having a clue about how the [service] is run. We have cut down on everything but I can't now say that to save more means that now [we] will be closed on Wednesdays because we don't have any money for a caretaker to keep the place open, because the personnel officer at the town hall is too busy to recruit a new caretaker for us.
Astrid argued that it made a mockery of the district's slogan, to put serviceusers in focus when the town hall seemed to be making cuts in all services but not in its own activities. We can see that the pressure on Astrid is diverted from both politicians, who do not like to say that they are cutting services (preferring to make them 'more effective') and the senior management in the district who pass budget cuts on to service providers without appearing to be concerned about the consequences. But the net effect is to make Astrid question both her loyalty to the district, to her immediate boss and the chief executive, the respect that politicians afford her as a professional in her field, and her personal integrity and commitment to the work that she does. The political becomes personal in ways that press upon her identity as a professional, responsible, and committed service-manager. Further, the personal effects on her as an individual include the weakening of her self-confidence as a competent manager.
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The 'dark side' of loyalty Loyalty has other connotations within Vestforstad, however, and the chief executive's comments at a meeting about his disappointment over loyalty still being an issue within the council alert us to these. Some council officers felt that the chief executive's interpretation of loyalty was rather too instrumental. Indeed, articles have appeared in the local press about anonymous letters having been sent to the mayor, the council's senior committee and the press accusing the chief executive of running a regime of yes-men. They suggest that the style of loyalty he demands is an unswerving obedience to his rule. Others had also suggested to me that the chief executive demands a style of loyalty from his leading group that smacks of obedience, and senior planners indicated that leaders must demonstrate enthusiastic agreement with the chief executive to demonstrate that loyalty. Hence, the director who, despite carrying out the chief executive's instructions, lost his job as a result of his lack of verbal enthusiasm (or, some would say, his resistance to the chief executive's style). In fact, during a comprehensive recent reorganization of the council's administration, only one of four directors was reappointed to directorships under the new management structure. One was told that he had not been the support to the chief executive that he might have expected, another declined to apply without publicly explaining his decision, although he privately was very critical of the leadership style of the council, and the third, who intended to retire, was angry that a senior member of his staff had been told that she would not proceed through the first round of reorganization. Some in the administration went as far as to voice suspicions, privately, that the whole massive reorganization process had been staged in order to rid the chief executive of a small number of senior staff. This does seem rather unlikely since their fixed-term positions would have been up for reappointment anyway, but the realism of the claim is not the point here. Rather, it illustrates the degree of unease within the council over the chief executive's style. Astrid, indeed, questioned whether the chief executive recognized whether the sort of absolute loyalty he seemed to demand ran counter to democratic principles. In the chief executive's conversations with me, however, it was clear that he was heavily influenced by business sector management principles and aimed to style council management along private sector lines. Even he, however, recognized that there were limits to the extent to which this could be done without jeopardizing the effectiveness of the political system. However, from the discussions about loyalty within the council, it was clear that it could be a dubious virtue, with hints of disciplinary control as well as order. In a later conversation, the chief executive appeared very concerned over whether the people working for him might feel inhibited in speaking out to him, claiming that was not what he wanted at all, although others wondered if that was not what he wanted others to think. Claims about the style of the chief executive relate, I would argue, not only to his personal leadership methods, but to his attempts to solve what may be seen as irreducible dilemmas within the council: a council that puts 'users in focus', that runs high-quality services, but which keeps a tight economic hold, and therefore enforces budget cuts, while all the time avoiding reducing its level of service. These contradictory elements run through the organization, reappearing as personality problems, relationship problems and loyalty problems at various points.
Conclusions
First, I should reiterate here that this analysis is not intended to produce a generalizable theory of loyalty, but to examine the way that a discourse around loyalty characterizes institutional dilemmas in this case. To that end, there is no discussion of further aspects of loyalty (e.g. personal relationships of loyalty to friends or family, to secrets or other forms), notably the loyalty of employees to the organization, and their willingness to leave (that is, I have not considered the form of loyalty which Hirschman considers as an alternative to exit [Hirschman, 1970] ). Neither have I made any judgements on the different expressions of loyalty presented. There are, of course, broader questions about comparative expressions of loyalty, and its role in distancing tensions in the practice of public servants. Many of the dilemmas outlined above echo experiences of planners elsewhere (Thomas and Healey, 1991) . In this instance, however, my aim was to examine the extent of dilemmas on the personality demands of public servants in this organization, in the hope of raising awareness of such issues in other situations.
Before we simply understand that the corporate image of councils demands loyalty from administrators just as private corporations discipline employees, we do, however, need to put these individual dilemmas into a wider governmental context. One of the consequences of the shedding of responsibility for priorities by administrators is precisely to put that responsibility squarely on the plate of the politicians. In that way, the administration can feel blameless for poor political budget-management. One might wonder whether the preference for a kind of professionalism that requires a distance from the consequences of decisions leaves us with a style of bureaucracy which risks being complacent about political judgements. Many of the administrators in this case study considered, like many planners, in fact, that their role implied a political stance of ensuring that people were properly represented and their interests accounted for. They therefore argued strongly (prior to decision-making) that the interests of the weakest should be considered central to any policy (Neumann and Makt-og globaliseringsutredningen, 2001 ).
However, for politicians who rely on the administration for the material on which to base their decisions, the distancing between information and decisions was not such a clear-cut process. It is well recognized in writing on public-sector planning that administrators have a great deal of informal and tactical influence on decision makers, if they know how to use it (Forester, 1989) . However, this particular article is not really about the power of planners in relation to politicians. What I hope to show is that the upholding of corporate cohesion may require an ideology of behaviours that may also circumscribe the sorts of personal qualities or character that employees must have, causing internalized personal difficulties for employees. Public administration therefore makes demands on not only what is called in Norwegian the competence (i.e. qualifications, experience, etc.) of an individual to manage a service, but the character of the person. This is established via their 'professionalism', here defined as their ability to distance themselves from the consequences of their actions. Furthermore, their commitment to their actual profession must be restrained with reference to the difference between their professional opinion, their personal emotions and beliefs, and the politically defined priorities they must follow in the conduct of their work. I argue that this is particularly difficult for those who work as leaders of services, to whom the dilemmas of constrained resources and unconstrained demands present the most practical problems. Whilst their employees can pass responsibility up the managerial hierarchy, and town hall economists can pass the responsibility down, leaders of public services are faced with trying to balance the budget with the practical consequences of cuts. It is they, therefore, who may face the most stringent personal dilemmas and whose characters are under most scrutiny. 'It takes a special type of person' to manage the split between personal responsibility to clients and loyalty to the district's politicians and chief executive.
The head of the development control department expressed something rather close to this: Some people really take it upon themselves that things should be how they want them. And perhaps in the long term this kind of job doesn't really suit them. Because you shouldn't be so weak that you simply let others steer you. But you also mustn't be so rigid that you can't manage to accept that others come in with other roles to have their share of the steering.
It becomes part of the requirement of the individual to be able to balance the conflicting demands of professional opinion, instructions from the leadership, political decisions and demands from 'clients' or users of public services. We might say, therefore, that the individual administrator internalizes the larger dilemmas that form the context for local politics. This form of internalization, which Foucault described as the effect of disciplinary processes being taken for granted (as detailed by Huxley, 2002) , appears as though it were a personality-related difficulty for professionals (Thomas and Healey, 1991) , but in fact represents a structural dilemma in the organization of public service. Through such detailed examination of the collective representations of participants in a particular municipality, we can see how what might appear as a psychological problem for individuals (as argued by Tewdwr-Jones, 2002) can be understood as an essential feature of the socio-political context.
Notes
1. In this case, fieldwork consisted of an 'immersion' in the practices of the municipality. I was offered an office within the town hall, where planners and other central executive functions were carried out. I attended administrative and political meetings, following particular processes (such as the revision of the master plan and municipal reorganization) as well as general routine events, joining employees and others for social occasions. I was included in private meetings within the administration, and was invited to participate in study tours and residential seminars. I also conducted a series of detailed interviews with administrators and politicians. For a discussion of workplace-based ethnographic fieldwork see Gellner and Hirsch (2001) .
2. All proper names are pseudonyms.
3. This situation was echoed to some extent by the chief planner of an English district where I conducted fieldwork during 1997. As he states:
The interesting thing is that the decisions are all taken by politicians, not by the planners or the officers of the council. So they are actually taken by the politicians. But the British planning system is essentially supposed to be apolitical. It's baseddecision making is based upon the weighing of advantage and disadvantage on landuse planning issues alone and our job, as officers, is to advise the members of those land-use-planning issues, and indeed, to tell them that they mustn't take anything else into account. However, there are frequently circumstances where on the one hand and on the other are so equally balanced, that the members may in fact, take into account, or give greater weight to certain elements and public opinion may be one of those, which is then political. . . . The planning machine is required to come up with a plan in consultation with the people, and if that consultation has got to mean anything, it has got to allow people to have an input over the shape of the plan. And my professional integrity is as much allowing them, and equipping them, as best I possibly can, to have their say, to allow them to shape their plan. And at the end of the day, it isn't my plan, it isn't a plan based upon my professional integrity, it is the community's plan, and what I've done is help them prepare the plan which they own. Now, it may not have been the plan that I would have prepared, but my job is not actually to prepare a plan and foist it upon them, it's to help them come up with their plan. That's how I have to deal with the questions of a difference between a political integrity and a technicaland I think that's the difference between technical and professional.
